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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 44

CPLR 325(d): Damages sought not limited by monetary jurisdiction
in lower court after transfer by supreme court without plaintiff's consent.
Article VI, section 19(a) of the New York State Constitution empowers the supreme court to transfer actions and proceedings over
which it does not have exclusive jurisdiction, independent of the
amount of damages sought, to any other court in the judicial department possessing jurisdiction of the subject matter and over the parties.
It has been noted that this provision is self-executing, thus permitting
75
the supreme court to ease its calendar congestion directly.

The constitution further permits the state legislature to provide
that verdicts or judgments in such transferred actions shall not be subject to the lower monetary jurisdiction of the court to which the action
is transferred.7 6 Accordingly, CPLR Rule 325(d) was enacted in 1968,
and the legislature thereby delegated this power to the appellate division.7 7 To date, calendar conditions in the state have been such that
transfer rules have only been adopted by the appellate divisions in
the third 8 and fourth 79 judicial departments.
Kloc v. Cissell ° affords a recent illustration of the operation of the
transfer rule in the fourth department. The trial court transferred
plaintiff's action to recover damages for personal injuries to a city court
because the potential recovery was, in the court's view, within the
monetary jurisdiction of the city court. However, the trial court had
neglected to consider any of plaintiff's medical testimony. The appellate division nevertheless affirmed in light of the fact that plaintiff
would not be aggrieved by such transfer since his recovery would not
now be limited by the monetary ceiling in the city court.
ARTICLE 10

-

PARTIES GENERALLY

CPLR 1007: Prematuresuit for indemnification not permitted.
Under CPLR 1007, third party indemnity suits are permitted by
defendant "after the service of his answer." However, a premature in75 Frankel Associates, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 45 Misc. 2d 607, 610, 257 N.Y.S.2d
555, 558 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965); 1 WEINSTEIN, KORN 8: MILLER, NEW YoRK CIVIL PRACTIcE 325.04 (1968).
76 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 19(k).
77 See 7B MCKINEY'S CPLR 325, supp. commentary 218 (1968).
78 22 NYCRR 861.18 (1969).
79 N.Y. STANDAm CIVIL PRAcTIcE DEsK BOOK, supp. 108 (3d ed. 1969). See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 325, supp. commentary 218, 219 (1968): "In view of the congestion in the
lower courts of the first and second departments, implementing provisions in these departments do not seem to be in the offing."
80 31 App. Div. 2d 885, 298 N.Y.S.2d 107 (4th Dep't 1969).

